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ARTICLES
THE BISHOP'S ALTER EGO:
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AND THE
CATHOLIC PRIEST SEX ABUSE SCANDAL
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGEt & AARON H. COLEtt
In 1968, William Sheffield visited the ancient Hospice du
Grand St. Bernard in Switzerland, a monastery of the Canons
Regular of St. Augustine, a Roman Catholic religious order of
priests. While in Switzerland, Sheffield contracted with the
cleric in charge, Father Bernard Cretton, to buy a St. Bernard
dog for $175 plus the $125 freight to ship the dog to Sheffield's
home in California. Sheffield was to pay the price in $20
installments and Cretton agreed to ship the dog upon receipt of
the first $20.1
Sheffield made three $20 payments, but the monastery
refused either to ship a dog or to refund his money. Sheffield
then sued in California state court for the price of his substitute
dog ($200) and his non-refunded $60. In the suit, he named
Cretton, the Canons Regular, the Vatican, the Pope, and the local
archdiocese (in the person of then-presiding Archbishop of San
Francisco).2
t Professor, UCLA School of Law.
it J.D., UCLA School of Law, 2004; Associate, Irell & Manella LLP, Los Angeles,
California.
1 Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 338, 340 (Ct. App.
1971).
2 Id. A diocese is defined in Catholic canon law as the "portion of the people of
God which is entrusted to a bishop." CODEX IURIS CANONICI c.369 (Canon Law Soc'y
of Am. trans., 1983) [hereinafter CIC-1983]. In practice, the dioceses are the
geographic regions into which the Church is divided for administrative purposes.
Each diocese is subdivided into local parishes. Id. c.374, § 1. An archdiocese "is
generally a diocese whose bishop exercises metropolitan authority within a province
composed of the archdiocese and several suffragan dioceses; occasionally such a
diocese stands by itself outside the provincial structure." 1 NEW CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA 634 (2d ed. 2003). The title of archbishop is bestowed, inter alia, on a
"metropolitan," i.e., "the head of an ecclesiastical Province (or regional group of
dioceses), and it may be said that today in the West every metropolitan is an
66 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 46:65
Although Sheffield apparently was able to serve process on
and obtain personal jurisdiction with respect to the Archbishop of
San Francisco, he faced significant obstacles in doing so with
respect to both the Pope and the monastic defendants. In an
attempt to circumvent those problems, Sheffield invoked the
alter ego doctrine.
The complaint alleged that defendants Archbishop and the
Canons Regular of St. Augustine were controlled and dominated
by defendants Roman Catholic Church, the Bishop of Rome and
the Holy See, such that there existed a
"unity of interest and ownership between all and each of the
defendants," that the Archbishop and the Canons Regular were
a "mere shell and naked framework which defendants Roman
Catholic Church, The Bishop of Rome, and The Holy See, have
used and do now use as a mere conduit for the conduit of their
ideas, business, property, and affairs," and that all defendants
are "alter egos" of each other.3
The court rejected Sheffield's argument, holding that the
"uncontroverted" evidence that "the Archbishop had no dealings
with the Canons Regular negates any possibility that the
Archbishop so controlled and dominated that organization so as
to be liable for its actions under the 'alter ego' doctrine."4
archbishop," and "the diocesan bishop of a diocese that is outside any ecclesiastical
province but itself is not a metropolitan see." Id. at 632. The terms Vatican,
"Apostolic See," or "Holy See" refer generally to the Pope and the various executive,
legislative, and judicial offices of the Roman Curia, which act in the Pope's name and
by his authority. See CIC-1983, supra, cc.360-61. The Holy See is "a sui generis
entity which has acquired an international legal status similar to a state under
customary international law." Anne Hsiu-An Hsiao, Is China's Policy to Use Force
Against Taiwan a Violation of the Principle of Non- Use of Force Under International
Law?, 32 NEw ENG. L. REV. 715, 724-25 (1998). According to Catholic canon law, the
Pope is "the head of the college of bishops, the Vicar of Christ, and the pastor of the
universal Church on earth. By virtue of his office he possesses supreme, full,
immediate, and universal ordinary power in the Church, which he is always able to
exercise freely." CIC-1983, supra, c.331. In U.S. law, the Pope is regarded as the
head of state of the Vatican. See Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 408 F. Supp. 2d
272, 280-82 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that Pope Benedict XVI, as head of the Holy
See, was entitled to head-of-state immunity from suit).
3 Roman Catholic Archbishop, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 340 (emphasis omitted).
4 Id. at 342. The question of whether Sheffield would have obtained jurisdiction
over any of the non-U.S. resident defendants is beyond the scope of this article. One
of the authors (Bainbridge) was informed by one of his colleagues who teaches Civil
Procedure that the Pope would not be a proper defendant, just as the CEO of a
corporation would not be a proper defendant to a suit alleging that subordinate
agents of the corporation had breached a contract. Moreover, the United States
currently accords the Vatican status as a foreign sovereign (i.e. a State), which
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Thus ended a seemingly trivial case, but one that in fact
presages issues of substantial present day import for the Catholic
Church. Indeed, the question of whether various Catholic
institutions are alter egos of one another or part of a single
enterprise became vitally consequential when the sex abuse by
Catholic priests scandal broke. 5 Since 1950, more than 11,500
abuse claims have been filed.6 At least 1,500 abuse cases were
pending as of mid-2003, with at least 500 pending against the
Archdiocese of Boston alone. 7 As of the beginning of 2006, there
were pending more than 560 abuse cases against just the Los
Angeles Archdiocese.8 It was estimated that the worst 50 cases
pending in Los Angeles could lead to jury awards of $5 million
each. 9 The total direct costs to the Catholic Church of the priest
abuse litigation are predicted to range from $2 to $3 billion. 10
means that the Pope should enjoy immunity as the head of a foreign state. In
addition, § 1605(a)(2) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-
11 (2000), in effect creates subject matter jurisdiction over foreign states for
commercial activity but only if the activity is "carried on in the United States by the
foreign state." So, for example, the purchase of the dog in Switzerland would not be
covered. Section 1605 provides for service of process in various ways, but it would
not be relevant because of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In the event that these procedural hurdles were overcome by a priest sex abuse
plaintiff, Mark Sargent observes that the "strong tradition of episcopal
independence," which "leaves bishops without any significant supervision in their
actual administration of the diocese," would also make "Vatican liability for diocesan
obligations unlikely." Mark A. Sargent, The Diocese After Chapter 11, 29 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 427, 431 (2005).
5 See generally U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE NATURE AND
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS BY CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND
DEACONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A RESEARCH STUDY CONDUCTED BY THE JOHN JAY
COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, http://www.usccb.org/nrb/johnjaystudy/index.htm
[hereinafter U.S. CONFERENCE, JOHN JAY STUDY]. The problem of pastoral sex
abuse, of course, is not limited to the Catholic Church. See James T. O'Reilly &
JoAnn M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Misconduct: Confronting the Difficult
Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST. THOMAS. L. REV. 31, 34 (1994)
("[Tlhere appears to be no distinction among denominations.").
6 Catholic Church's Costs Pass $1 Billion in Abuse Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
2005, at 133.
7 Daniel Lyons, Sex, God & Greed, FORBES, June 9, 2003, at 66.
8 Jean Guccione & Glenn F. Bunting, Talks on Sex Abuse by Priests Are
Restarted, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2006, at Al.
9 Id.
10 Ken Kusmer, Clergy Abuse Scandal's Cost May Top $2 Billion, AKRON
BEACON J., July 10, 2005, at A7. No implication is intended that pastoral abuse of
parishioners is a problem unique to the Catholic Church.
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The key institutional defendant in most of these cases is the
diocese to which the priest-offender was assigned.11 Typically,
the diocese is held directly liable for negligent hiring or
supervision of priests; more rarely, the diocese may be held
vicariously liable for a priest's sexual misconduct. 12 When the
plaintiff seeks to enforce a judgment against diocesan assets, a
potentially critical legal issue is whether assets nominally owned
by the diocese are in fact held in trust by the diocese for the
benefit of local parishes, schools, or other church actors. 13 In
other cases, however, the critical issue is whether diocesan
creditors can reach the assets of separate legal entities under
some version of alter ego liability. It is with this latter class of
cases that this Article is concerned.
Part I of this Article provides the relevant background by
examining the legal structure of Catholic dioceses and entities
that are affiliated to varying degrees with dioceses, such as
separately incorporated parishes, missions, chapels, schools,
charities, and cemeteries. In many U.S. dioceses, all Church
assets are owned by a single corporation, typically a corporation
sole,1 4 by virtue of which the local bishop becomes the legal
11 Catholic priests are categorized as either diocesan or religious depending on
the Church authority to which they are responsible. Diocesan priests work in
parishes, schools, or other Catholic institutions as assigned by the bishop of their
diocese. Religious priests belong to a religious order, such as the Jesuits,
Dominicans, or Franciscans. Of the various Catholic officials alleged to have
committed sexual abuses, 69.4% were diocesan priests and 22.1% were religious
order priests (the remaining alleged abusers included deacons, bishops, seminarians,
and others). U.S. CONFERENCE, JOHN JAY STUDY, supra note 5, at 42. This article is
concerned solely with the application of alter ego and related doctrines to Catholic
dioceses and entities related to a diocese.
12 See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 5, at 39, 49 ('Most courts faced with
clergy sexual misconduct have declined to attribute such indirect liability to an
institutional hierarchy that lacked notice of the misconduct" but "[s]everal recent
cases have witnessed the successful utilization of negligence theories."); see also
Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 287 (Colo. 1988) (declining to hold the diocese
vicariously liable for a priest's sexual misconduct because "sexual intercourse with a
parishioner is not part of the priest's duties nor customary within the business of the
church" but noting that "the diocese may be directly liable for negligently
supervising" the priest).
13 See, e.g., In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 335 B.R. 842, 866 (Bankr. D. Or.
2005) ("Because the parishes are not separately incorporated, as they could be under
Oregon religious corporations law, they cannot hold title to real property. They are
not separate from, but are merely a part of debtor.")
14 "A corporation sole is one consisting of one person only, and his successors in
some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some
legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity." Doe v. Gelineau,
THE BISHOP'S ALTER EGO
titleholder of all Church-affiliated property in the diocese.' 5 For
example, the Catholic Archbishop of Boston, a corporation sole,
holds title to all Church-related property, including parishes,
schools, and churches, in about eighty-eight cities and towns.16
As a legal matter, these holdings belong to the corporation sole
and could be used to satisfy tort judgment against the
corporation sole. As noted, however, the Church argues that
many of the assets are held in trust by the corporation sole and
therefore should not be used to satisfy the corporation sole's
debts.
Although the single corporation sole for over a century has
been a standard legal structure under which many Catholic
dioceses are organized, other dioceses long have separately
incorporated at least some of their affiliated juridic persons. 17 In
an apparent response to the liability crisis resulting from the
priest sex abuse scandal, moreover, there seems to be a growing
trend for diocesan assets to be divided among multiple
incorporated entities. 8 Indeed, critics claim that the Church
thus is "us[ing] the intricacies of corporate law to
shelter . . . assets from plaintiffs alleging sexual abuse by
priests."1 9  In May 2002, for example, when the Denver
Archdiocese incorporated five parishes separately from the
diocese, critics accused the Church of doing so to shield assets
from the claims of sexual abuse plaintiffs. 20
732 A.2d 43, 45 n.3 (R.I. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Its successor
becomes the corporation on his death or resignation, [and has been] limited in the
main today to bishops and heads of dioceses." Id.
15 William F. McCarthy, Diocesan Asset Management Strategies: The Civil Law
Perspective, 37 CATH. LAW. 117, 118 (1996).
16 E-mail from Walter V. Robinson, Boston Globe Staff, to Aaron H. Cole (Dec.
27, 2002) (on file with Aaron H. Cole).
17 See McCarthy, supra note 15, at 124 (noting a Massachusetts diocese that has
had separately incorporated parishes since the 1870s).
is Cf. Milo Geyelin, Earthly Assets: Besieged Church Tries to Protect Vast Real
Estate-Fearing Sex-Abuse Awards, Dioceses Restructure; Incorporating the Parish-
"We Did It for Clarification,' WALL ST. J., May 15, 2002, at Al (quoting allegations by
plaintiffs' lawyers that the diocese "started going through their assets and shoving
them back to local parishes"). This trend provides a two-way protection. In the first,
the principle of limited liability means that the assets of separately incorporated
parishes or other Church-affiliated entities are immune from claims by diocesan
creditors. Where parish operations generate liability for the separately incorporated
parish, limited liability will insulate diocesan assets from parish creditors.
19 Geyelin, supra note 18.
20 Jennifer Levitz, Roman Catholic Bishop, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 18, 2002, at
Al; see also Frank Gibney, Jr., Can a Church Go Broke?, TIME, June 3, 2002
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Although separate incorporation of diocesan assets
implicates a number of legal doctrines, 21 alter ego claims likely
will play a central role in any litigation seeking to reach the
assets of such corporations for the benefit of diocesan creditors.22
Accordingly, Part II of this Article sets out the relevant legal
principles and provides guidance for their application to the
special problems posed by litigation against religious
corporations.
I. THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN
THE UNITED STATES
A business corporation is the principal of its employee-agents
and, accordingly, incurs contractual or tort obligations because of
its agents' actions.23 As with any other principal, the corporation
may be held vicariously liable for the actions of its agents. 24
Because the law generally does not regard a corporation as the
agent of its shareholders, however, those shareholders may not
be held vicariously liable for the firm's torts or debts.2 5
("[S]everal dioceses have persuaded plaintiffs to accept reduced settlements, on the
grounds that they could not afford to pay more.... [Meanwhile] leaders divide
church property among dozens if not hundreds of separate corporations.").
21 For example, under appropriate circumstances, a transfer of assets into a new
corporation could be attacked as a fraudulent conveyance. See, e.g., Carr Enters.,
Inc. v. United States, 539 F. Supp. 528, 528 (D.S.D. 1982) (finding a fraudulent
conveyance where taxpayers involved in an income tax dispute with the federal
government transferred assets to two corporations, which they controlled, and then
transferred the stock in those corporations to a newly formed church of which
taxpayers constituted two of the three church trustees, as well as the minister);
Voorhees v. Presbyterian Church, 5 How. Pr. 58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850) (holding that
fraudulent conveyance law was applicable to transfer of assets to a religious
corporation).
22 See Roundtable Discussion: Religious Organizations Filing for Bankruptcy, 13
AM. BANKER. INST. L. REV. 25, 35 (2005) ("[Ihf the parishes actually happen to be
different corporations, which is a possibility, then the claimants will look at alter ego
claims and what control the diocese is exercising over those different parishes and
assets.").
23 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140 (1958) (setting out basic
principles governing principal's liability for contracts entered into by agent); id.
§ 219 (same for torts committed by agent).
24 See, e.g., Parker v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 629 So. 2d 1026, 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding franchisor-corporation vicariously liable for acts of franchisee-
agent); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin, 222 S.W.2d 995, 997 (Tex. 1949)
(same).
25 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14M cmt. a (stating that ownership
of a majority of the stock of a corporation standing alone does not make the
corporation the owner's agent).
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A traditional explanation for this rule is that the corporation
is a legal person separate from its shareholders. 26 Hence, it is
the corporation that incurs the debt or commits the tort and the
corporation which must bear the responsibility for its actions.
Although this explanation obviously is highly formalistic,27 "the
notion of corporate personhood has long been a settled convention
in our law."28  In turn, the doctrine of corporate veil piercing
(a.k.a. the alter ego doctrine) is invoked where the shareholders
have failed to respect the corporation's separate personhood. 29
The alter ego doctrine applies not only to shareholders of a
single closely held corporation, but also to corporate groups.
Where a subsidiary corporation is unable to satisfy the claims
against it, the subsidiary's creditors may seek to have the parent
corporation and/or other subsidiaries of the same parent treated
as alter egos of the debtor corporation. In effect, the alter ego
doctrine thus ignores the separate legal personality of the
individual members of the corporate group and treats them as a
single legal person for liability purposes.30
Likewise, when a diocese is sued, a preliminary question is
whether the law will treat the diocese and its affiliates, such as
parishes, schools, hospitals, and charities, as separate legal
persons, such that the assets of the latter are not available to
26 Cf. Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569-70 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding that veil piercing remedy could be invoked where, inter alia, "the
separate personalities of the corporation and the individual [or other corporation] no
longer exist" (alteration in original)).
27 James McConvill & Mirko Bagaric, Opting Out of Shareholder Governance
Rights: A New Perspective on Contractual Freedom in Australian Corporate Law, 3
DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 255, 256 (2005) ("[Contractarians view the corporation
not as a separate and distinct legal entity with its own personality and post office
box, but rather as a 'nexus of contracts,' a label representing the series of contracts
exchanged and performed between suppliers, creditors, employees, employers and
other stakeholders.").
28 Reading Int'l, Inc. v. Oaktree Capital Mgmt. LLC, 317 F. Supp. 2d 301, 327
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
29 See, e.g., Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns,
Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1072 (D. Colo. 2004).
A subsidiary is the alter ego of its parent when (1) there is such a unity of
interest and lack of respect given to separate identity of parent and
subsidiary that personalities and assets of parent and subsidiary are
indistinct, and (2) adherence to the corporate fiction sanctions fraud,
promotes injustice, or leads to an evasion of legal obligations.
Id.
30 See infra notes 88-100 and accompanying text (discussing application of alter
ego doctrine to corporate groups).
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satisfy claims against the former. As we shall see, although
canon law treats these entities as legally separate persons,
secular law does not. In the face of potentially crippling
liabilities arising out of the priest sex abuse scandals, some
dioceses have responded by incorporating such affiliates, so as to
claim the limited liability benefit that follows from creation of
separate legal persons.
A. Background: The Hierarchical Constitution of the Church
The Catholic Church is governed by bishops. The doctrinal
basis for their power arises out of the apostolic succession; i.e.,
their position as successors to the original twelve apostles of
Jesus Christ: "The Bishops ... succeed the apostles";31 "[tlo the
apostles and their successors Christ has entrusted the office of
teaching, sanctifying and governing in his name and by his
power."
32
The Pope's authority arises from the same source; it "has its
foundation in the fact that he is a bishop,"33 a successor to the
apostles. Uniquely among bishops, however, the Pope's position
in the hierarchical constitution of the Church is further grounded
in his position as successor to Peter, the head of the apostles:
The "bishop of the Roman Church, in whom continues the office
given by the Lord uniquely to Peter, the first of the Apostles, and
to be transmitted to his successors ... possesses supreme, full,
immediate and universal power in the Church, which he is
always able to exercise freely. '34
A bishop governs a definite territory, known as a "particular
church" or "diocese." 35  A bishop within his diocese "has all
ordinary, proper and immediate power."36 The diocesan bishop
thus possesses legislative, executive, and judicial power. 37
31 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 938 (2d ed. 1997).
32 Id. 873; see also id. 881 ("This pastoral office of Peter and the other
apostles... is continued by the bishops under the primacy of the Pope.")
33 NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW 435 (John P. Beal et al. eds.,
2000) [hereinafter COMMENTARY].
34 CIC-1983, supra note 2, c.331. The situation is complicated because canon law
recognizes that the college of bishops also exercises "'supreme and full' power in the
Church," albeit "only together with the pope." COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at 433.
35 CIC-1983, supra note 2, c.368 ("Particular churches, in which and from which
the one and only Catholic Church exists, are first of all dioceses.").
36 Id. c.381, § 1.
37 Id. c.391.
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According to canon law, each diocese is divided into "distinct
parts or parishes. '38 As dioceses are entrusted to the care of a
bishop, parishes are entrusted to the care of a pastor, who
"carries out the functions of teaching, sanctifying and
governing."3 9  Among other things, the parish priest is
responsible for administering the temporal goods or assets of the
parish in accordance with the rules of canon law.
B. The Separate Personhood of Parishes and Dioceses in Canon
Law
Canon law views both a diocese and its individual parishes
as distinct juridic persons. 40 The commentary to Canon 393 thus
provides that "[ojnce it has been legitimately erected, a diocese
possesses juridic personality. '41 Likewise, per Canon 515, the
parish "possesses juridic personality."42  Just as the bishop
represents the diocese in its juridic affairs, 43 the parish priest
represents the parish in all its juridic affairs. 44
In canon law, "ownership of goods belongs to that juridic
person which has acquired them legitimately."45  Accordingly,
canon law views assets of a specific parish as being owned by the
parish rather than the diocese. 46 Assets of parishes and other
38 Id. c.374, § 1.
39 Id. cc.515, 519.
40 See J. Michael Fitzgerald, The Official Catholic Directory: Civil and Canon
Law Requirements, 30 CATH. LAW. 107, 120 (1986) ("A juridic person is also an
artificial being, but is created by canon law and endowed with certain rights and
responsibilities of its own. It is an aggregate of person or things."). Canon law
distinguishes between public juridic persons, "whose personality is conferred upon
them by law (e.g., dioceses, parishes, religious institutes)," which may "act 'in the
name of the Church,'" and "private juridic persons [which] receive their personality
only by decree of competent authority and act only in their own name."
COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at 1456. The status of certain Catholic entities, such
as hospitals and schools, as public or private depends on the terms of the decree by
which they were created. Id.
41 COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at 529.
42 CIC-1983, supra note 2, c.515, § 3.
43 COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at 529. Juridic acts or affairs are those to which
canon law assigns legal character-i.e., the law attaches "juridic consequences to
them"-such as "sale of property, contracting marriage, religious profession,
conferral of an office." Id. at 177.
44 CIC-1983, supra note 2, c.532. The parish, like the diocese, is a non-collegial
juridic person; its "members do not determine its actions through common decision
making." COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at 681.
45 CIC-1983, supra note 2, c.1256.
46 COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at 1457 ("Thus, property legitimately acquired
2007]
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public juridic persons within a diocese thus are ordinarily
administered by the priest who governs the entity in question,
and not by the diocesan bishop.47
To be sure, canon law exhorts the bishop to "exercise careful
vigilance" over ecclesiastical goods within his diocese to foster
observance of the laws of the Church regarding the
administration of temporal goods. 48 This responsibility flows
from the bishop's general duty to "protect unity of the universal
Church" by promoting "common discipline" and urging the
"observance of all ecclesiastical laws."49  Even so, however, the
bishop only administers the ecclesiastical goods of the diocese,
not the ecclesiastical goods of other public juridic persons, such
as parishes, that reside within the diocese. 50
The Church has poorly translated into secular terms the
canon law understanding of the relationship between diocese and
parish. The next section explores the significant divergence
between the requirements of canon law and the dominant secular
forms of organization chosen by the Church hierarchy in the
United States.
by a parish-which, by law, is a juridic person-is owned by the parish, not by the
diocese, which is a distinct juridic person." (citation omitted)).
47 Id. at 1477.
The administrator of ecclesiastical goods is ordinarily the person who
directly governs the public juridic person to whom the goods belong. Thus,
for example, a pastor is the administrator of the temporal goods belonging
to a parish. A diocesan bishop is the administrator of goods belonging to the
public juridic person known as the diocese, but he is not the administrator
of parochial and all other ecclesiastical goods situated within the diocese.
Id. (citations omitted). Ecclesiastical goods are the temporal assets of a public juridic
person. Id. at 1458.
48 CIC-1983, supra note 2, c.1276.
49 Id. c.392, § 1.
50 This understanding of the principle of separate administration by public
juridic persons of their own goods is implied by Canon 1279, which provides for the
bishop to intervene in cases of a negligent administrator, and to appoint
administrators for a "public juridic person which does not have its own
administrators by law." Id. c.1279. Such a provision would be unnecessary if the
bishop was the administrator of the goods of all public juridic persons within the
diocese. Furthermore, while the bishop, in his supervisory role under canon 1276,
may "issue appropriate regulatory instructions for the administration of
ecclesiastical goods," he "cannot derogate from the law (e.g., by attempting to take
away from pastors their right and duty to administer the goods of the parishes)."
COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at 1477.
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C. The Diocese in Secular Corporate Law
The Catholic Church claims to be independent from civil
authority with respect to the acquisition, possession,
administration, and disposition of its temporal goods.51
Nevertheless, seemingly recognizing the realities of life in
modern secular regulatory nations, canon law urges that Church
assets be maintained so as to ensure their protection under civil
law.5 2 In the United States, the Church has done so by availing
itself of incorporation under state law.
American corporation law offers religious organizations a
number of statutory forms through which they can gain "legal
recognition, status and rights, particularly the right to acquire
and hold property." 53  Among these are the unincorporated
association, the charitable trust, a not-for-profit corporation, a
religious corporation, and the corporation sole. 54 In states where
the final option is available, it has been the usual choice for
Catholic dioceses.
The corporation sole was developed in mid-fifteenth century
England as a vehicle for ownership of ecclesiastical property. 55 It
was designed to prevent church property from being treated, by
the law, as personal property of the incumbent bishop or rector.
In the eyes of the law, the current officeholder, his successor, and
predecessor were a corporation-a legal single person-so that
gifts or conveyances to the current officeholder were considered
the property of the successor. 56 Upon the death, resignation, or
removal of the predecessor officeholder, "the successor to the
office becomes the corporation" and is vested with the title of all
property held by the predecessor.57
The adoption of the corporation sole form by American law
resulted principally from lobbying during the nineteenth century
51 CIC-1983, supra note 2, c.1254.
52 Id. c.1274, §§ 1, 5.
53 Patty Gerstenblith, Associational Structures of Religious Organizations, 1995
BYU L. REV. 439, 439-40 (1995).
54 Id. at 441.
55 EDWARD JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 118-19 (P. B. Fairest ed., 6th ed.
1967) ("[The] Crown is the only common law lay corporation sole.... But the
examples of ecclesiastical corporations sole are numerous. Every diocesan bishop,
every rector of a parish, is a corporation sole.")
56 Gerstenblith, supra note 53, at 455-56.
57 Id. at 454-55.
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by Catholic bishops.58 The bishops' motivation likely arose out
of the controversy over trusteeism.5 9 In the mid-nineteenth
century, some lay parishioners claimed that then-existing laws
under which their churches had been incorporated granted the
lay members of the church parochial administrative powers and
even the right to choose and dismiss pastors. In 1854,
"trusteeists, conspiring with newly elected state legislators of the
anti-Catholic Know-Nothing Party, procured in New York,
Pennsylvania, and elsewhere laws intended to compel all
Catholic parishes to adopt the... trustee form of incorporation,"
which would have imposed Congregationalist (democratic)
polities on the Catholic church despite the clear hierarchical
structures mandated by Church teaching. 60
By obtaining legal recognition of the corporation sole and
then incorporating dioceses as such, American bishops were able
to turn back the trusteeists. In a corporation sole, as noted, "all,
or nearly all, church-related assets are civilly owned by a single
corporation whose sole member is the diocesan bishop."61  At
least insofar as intra-Church disputes are concerned, courts have
generally deferred to the argument that the corporation sole
58 Id. at 456.
59 According to one summary of the trusteeism controversy:
Whereas in earlier years, laypeople had sometimes been allowed to help
manage parish life, by the mid-nineteenth century priests were roundly
condemning lay initiatives as a "trusteeism" contrary to the right ordering
of a hierarchical church. In the same spirit, bishops asserted their
unqualified right to assign or reassign priests. Taking advantage of
American law, bishops constituted themselves "corporations sole," which
enabled them to hold all church property in a diocese in their own names.
THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 954 (Eric Foner & John A.
Garraty eds., 1991).
60 14 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 324-25 (1967). Similarly, the so-called
"incorporation movement" among Catholic colleges and universities sought to
separately incorporate these institutions so as to free them from "from their
sponsoring religious orders, enlarge their boards of trustees to include lay men and
women, and change the structure and governance of these institutions away from a
parochial, pervasively religious model." William W. Bassett, The American Civil
Corporation, the "Incorporation Movement" and the Canon Law of the Catholic
Church, 25 J.C. & U.L. 721, 725 (1999). According to one view of the matter, the
movement "used the instrumentality of the American civil corporation to open
Catholic higher education to ecumenism, scientific progress and diversity." Id. It
should be noted that the great majority of Catholic universities have no connection
with a diocese whatsoever; i.e., they are not diocesan institutions, but were founded
and run by independent religious orders, and are now controlled by independent
boards.
61 COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at 1457.
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owns parish property. Hence, for example, claims by
parishioners to the property of parishes ordered to be closed have
failed. In such cases, courts have treated the diocesan bishop as
holding legal title to the parish property through the corporation
sole.62
Although the corporation sole's widespread use in the
American Catholic Church thus arose out of-and solved-a
theological dispute, it has been very controversial within the
Church. First, and most crucially, it is impossible to square the
use of the corporation sole with canon law.63 As we have seen,
the Church, as a matter of doctrine and canon law, is composed of
numerous united but distinct entities, subject in varying ways
and degrees to ecclesiastical control. 64  Each separate entity
possesses rights (including rights of ownership) that are
enforceable, under church law, against the other entities. 65 The
assets of the Catholic Church, under canon law, thus do not
belong to a single owner. Instead, Church assets "belong to many
owners: the Apostolic See, individual dioceses, institutes of
consecrated life, societies of apostolic life, parishes, other public
juridic persons, private juridic persons, and natural persons
individually and in association." 66
Accordingly, centralization of "ownership and control of all
church property within a diocese is contrary to the law of the
Church."67  The use of a corporation sole to hold title to the
ecclesiastical property of the juridic persons within the diocese's
territory thus is a significant distortion of the Church's polity.
Indeed, in 1911, the Holy See told the American bishops that it
disapproved of using a single corporation sole as the single legal
owner of all property within a diocese; indeed, the Holy See
encouraged the separate incorporation of individual parishes.68
Presumably, the same would be true where a diocese civilly
62 See, e.g., Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 625 N.E.2d 1352, 1354, 1357
(Mass. 1994); Parent v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 436 A.2d 888, 890 (Me. 1981).
63 Mary Judith O'Brien, R.S.M., Instructions for Parochial Temporal
Administration, 41 CATH. LAW. 113, 134 (2001).
64 See supra Part II.C.1.
65 Cf. COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at 173 n.72 (explaining that ecclesiastical
tribunals "exist for the vindication of the rights of physical or juridic persons"). See
generally CIC-1983, supra note 2, cc.1400-1500 (discussing the legal rights of juridic
persons).
66 COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at 1452.
67 Id. at 1457.
68 See id.
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incorporated using some other statutory form, such as a
nonprofit or religious corporation, holds secular legal title to the
ecclesiastical property of all juridic persons within the diocese.
Second, incorporation as a corporation sole exposes the
assets of parishes and other juridic persons, which in canon law
are the property of such persons, to the claims of creditors of the
diocese. Conversely, by centralizing civil ownership in a single
entity, the corporation sole also exposes "all parochial and other
church-related assets within a diocese to satisfy creditors' claims
against any individual parish or institution."69 Again, the same
concerns would arise where a diocese civilly incorporated as a
nonprofit or religious corporation claiming secular legal title to
the ecclesiastical property of parishes and other juridic persons
within the diocese.
In an apparent attempt to mitigate these concerns, bishops
whose dioceses are incorporated as a corporation sole have
argued that they hold legal title to parish assets in trust and for
the benefit of the parish.70 This line of defense was prominently
tested in the Archdiocese of Portland's bankruptcy case.7 1 The
Archdiocese had been incorporated as a corporation sole under
Oregon law.7 2 Only one of the 124 parishes with the Archdiocese
had been separately incorporated.7 3 The three Catholic high
schools within the Archdiocese were not separately
incorporated.74  When the Archdiocese declared bankruptcy
under the weight of numerous priest sex abuse claims, the
Archbishop claimed that the bulk of the Archdiocese's assets
were in fact held in trust for the benefit of the unincorporated
parishes and other juridic persons within the diocese. 75
69 Id.
7o See, e.g., Schilling v. Malone, No. CA-5411, 1981 WL 6128, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 18, 1981) (holding that the bishop, in his capacity as holder of the property
in trust, was a proper defendant to a suit arising out of an injury that occurred on
parish property).
71 For an overview of bankruptcy law as applied to a diocesan bankruptcy, see
John B. Jarboe, Bankruptcy-The Last Resort: Protecting the Diocesan Client from
Potential Liability Judgments, 37 CATH. LAW. 153 (1996).
72 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 335 B.R. 842, 849 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 850.
75 See id. at 848; see also Andrew Harris, Forgive Us Our Debts: The Boston
Archdiocese May File for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 2002, at Al
(quoting Walter W. Miller, Jr., a bankruptcy law professor at Boston University, who
"calls identification of the archdiocese's property 'the heart of the whole thing' ").
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The Bankruptcy Court first held that the religion clauses of
the First Amendment did not deprive the court of jurisdiction
over the question of whether the assets purportedly held in trust
were properly part of the bankruptcy estate and thus subject to
the claims of the Archdiocese's creditors. 76 The court then held
that those same clauses did not require the court to defer to
canon law in determining the ownership of the assets in
question. 77 Next, the court held that Oregon state corporation
law likewise did not require the court to defer to canon law in
determining the ownership of the assets in question.78
Turning to the merits, the court noted that "[e]ven debtor's
own canon law expert acknowledges that being a separate juridic
person under canon law does not give that juridic person a civil
law identity."79 The court further explained:
In fact, unincorporated religious associations are not legal
persons that may take title to real property in their names.
Because the parishes are not separately incorporated, as they
could be under Oregon religious corporations law, they cannot
hold title to real property. They are not separate from, but are
merely a part of debtor.80
The court likewise rejected the Archbishop's argument "that,
even if the parishes are not legal entities that can hold title to
real property, they have sufficient legal existence to allow them
to be beneficiaries of a trust."81
Neither the First Amendment nor the bankruptcy law issues
posed by the Portland litigation are within the scope of this
Article. Instead, the Portland litigation is relevant to the
analysis herein for several other reasons. First, assuming the
result holds up on appeal (if any) and is followed in other
jurisdictions, it highlights the validity of the liability exposure
concerns that have long plagued the corporation sole form. The
assets of all juridic persons in a diocese incorporated as a
corporation sole are, in fact, at risk of being seized to satisfy the
claims of creditors either of the diocese and/or individual juridic
persons.
76 See In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 335 B.R. at 851-53.
77 See id. at 854.
78 See id. at 855-59.
79 Id. at 865-66.
80 Id. at 866 (citation omitted).
81 Id. at 867.
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Second, there is a civil law solution at hand; namely,
separate incorporation of each juridic person. As the Portland
bankruptcy judge observed:
Debtor has chosen to organize its operations under a
corporation sole. It chose to separately incorporate (or allow the
separate incorporation of) St. Elizabeth Parish; it could also
have chosen to incorporate the other parishes as religious
corporations, by which they would gain a civil legal status and
could exercise the powers granted to such corporations,
including the power to hold and dispose of property and to sue
and be sued. Debtor did not, however, choose to do that, and
gives no reason why it could not, under state law, have
separately incorporated the parishes or in some other way
organized itself to protect the canonical ownership rights, if any,
of the schools and parishes.82
Where a diocese avails itself of that option and separately
incorporates the various juridic persons within it, however, a new
issue arises; namely, whether the law will treat those separate
corporations as being mere alter egos of the Bishop's corporation
sole.
II. APPLYING THE ALTER EGO DOCTRINE TO DIOCESES AND
OTHER JURIDIC PERSONS
In at least some dioceses, concerns about liability exposure
appear to have trumped any lingering historical concerns related
to trusteeism. Indeed, critics claim that the Church is
attempting to judgment-prooP 3  dioceses by separately
incorporating parishes and other juridic persons within the
diocese.8 4  Although there are various legal doctrines that
82 Id.; see also Jill S. Manny, Governance Issues for Non-Profit Religious
Organizations, 40 CATH. LAW. 1, 1 (2000) ("The most popular and perhaps the best
way to effectively reduce risk is to separately incorporate the parishes, the dioceses,
and the various organizations that support the parishes and dioceses, such as fund-
raising entities.").
83 See generally Lynn Lopucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing,
51 STAN. L. REV. 147, 149-51 (1998) (describing the basic structure of judgment
proofing as the legal separation of a single enterprise into an operating (liability-
generating) entity and an asset-holding entity so that "judgment creditors of the
operating entity are not legally entitled to recover their judgments from the assets of
the owning entity," while the two entities continue, through a contractual
relationship, to function as a single enterprise).
84 See, e.g., Geyelin, supra note 18 (quoting allegations by plaintiffs' lawyers
that the diocese "started going through their assets and shoving them back to local
parishes"); Gibney, supra note 20.
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plaintiffs may invoke to raise such claims in litigation against a
diocese, the alter ego doctrine is likely to play a particularly
prominent role in any such case. If the doctrine is successfully
invoked, after all, the court will treat the diocese and any
separately incorporated juridic persons as a single enterprise
whose collective assets are subject to the claims of creditors of
the diocese (or of a parish, as the case may be).8 5
A. The Law of Enterprise Liability
Although judges often refer to something they call the alter
ego doctrine, that phrasing conflates two distinct corporate law
doctrines: (1) piercing the corporate veil and (2) enterprise
liability. The distinction between veil piercing and enterprise
liability is subtle, especially when one is dealing solely with
corporate groups rather than individual shareholders, but it is
critical. Properly understood, veil piercing is a vertical form of
liability-it provides a mechanism for holding a shareholder
personally liable for the corporation's obligations. Enterprise
liability provides a horizontal form of liability-it offers a vehicle
for holding the entire business enterprise liable.8 6
s5 In theory, any juridic person affiliated with a diocese is potentially at risk of
being deemed an alter ego of the diocese. In practice, however, many non-parish
juridic persons, such as hospitals and schools, are "highly regulated public service
institutions," which likely exercise considerable independence. Bassett, supra note
60, at 726. In addition, since the 1960s, in "Catholic hospitals, schools, colleges and
universities ... lay leaders have replaced or at least complemented clerical
leadership." Sargent, supra note 4, at 429. Since the issues such institutions present
under the alter ego doctrine will likely differ from those raised by the parish-diocese
relationship, this section focuses exclusively on the latter relationship.
86 In the leading case of Walkovszky v. Carlton, for example, plaintiff
Walkovszky complained that the corporation that employed the driver of the taxi cab
that had injured him, along with its numerous sister corporations, had no separate
existence but rather were components of defendant Carlton's single business
enterprise. 18 N.Y.2d 414, 416, 223 N.E.2d 6, 7, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 587 (1966). The
court held that the corporate veil may not be pierced simply because the defendant
corporation is part of a larger enterprise. Id. at 419, 223 N.E.2d at 9, 276 N.Y.S.2d at
589. Because the mere fact that a corporation is part of a larger enterprise is
insufficient to justify veil piercing, splitting a single business up into many different
corporate components thus will not result in the controlling shareholder being held
personally liable for the obligations of one of the corporate entities. At most, only the
larger corporate combined as a whole could be held liable. Id. at 421, 223 N.E.2d at
10, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 591. The distinction thus drawn between Carlton's personal
liability exposure and the potential liability of the corporate group nicely illustrates
the remedial distinction between veil piercing (a vertical form of shareholder
liability) and enterprise liability (vertical liability among the entity members of a
corporate group).
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As applied to an incorporated diocese, veil piercing thus
would result in the diocesan bishop being held personally liable
for the diocese's obligations.8 7 In most cases, this will not be the
result desired by plaintiffs at least in so far as enforcing a
judgment is concerned, since bishops rarely will have deep
pockets. Instead, plaintiffs normally would be seeking a form of
enterprise liability in which the diocese and any separately
incorporated parishes are treated as part of a single enterprise
for liability purposes.88 Accordingly, references to the alter ego
doctrine in this article should be understood as referring to
enterprise liability.
In any event, as illustrated by the St. Bernard case discussed
at the outset,8 9 courts have adapted the business corporation law
alter ego doctrine to analyze the relationship of juridic persons
within the Church for civil law purposes. In Doe v. Gelineau,90
87 Where the plaintiff is a creditor of a separately incorporated parish, veil
piercing might come into play if the court draws an analogy between the parish-
diocese relationship and that of a subsidiary to a parent corporation. As such, the
court might pierce the parish's corporate veil to reach the assets of the diocese,
perhaps going on to invoke the reverse veil piercing doctrine to reach the assets of
other separately incorporated parishes within the diocese.
Another possibility is that the plaintiff may seek to pierce the corporate veil of
the diocese to reach the world-wide assets of the Vatican, analogizing the
relationship between the Vatican and the diocese to that of a parent and subsidiary
corporation. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Avoiding Moral Bankruptcy, 44 B.C. L. REV.
1181, 1991 (2003). Indeed, in the St. Bernard dog case with which this Article
opened, the court noted that the plaintiff might have "raised a triable issue of fact as
to whether the Canons Regular of St. Augustine is an 'alter ego' of the Pope." Roman
Catholic Archbishop v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 338, 342 (Ct. App. 1971).
Because we assume that the Vatican and the Pope would be protected by sovereign
immunity, however, this Article does not assess the question of possible enterprise
liability of the Vatican. See supra notes 2-4 (discussing the legal status of the Pope
and the Holy See).
S The author Bainbridge has pointed out elsewhere that the parent-subsidiary
corporation relationship should be treated as a species of enterprise liability rather
than as a question of veil piercing:
To say that the subsidiary is the parent's alter ego and that the parent is
therefore liable for the subsidiary's obligations, after all, differs only
semantically from saying that the parent and the subsidiary are a single
business enterprise. In either case, a successful plaintiff will be able to
reach the combined assets of the parent and subsidiary. Put another way,
in the corporate group context, what has been labeled "veil piercing" has
been, in substance, enterprise liability all along. That being the case, courts
ought to shed the misleading label and call the analysis by its true name.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 532 (2001).
89 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
90 732 A.2d 43 (R.I. 1999).
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for example, plaintiffs claimed to have been abused while
residing at the Saint Aloysius Home. 91 The Home was a d/b/a of
the Rhode Island Catholic Orphan Asylum Corporation. 92
Although the Home thus was separately incorporated from the
local diocese, plaintiffs invoked the alter ego doctrine in an effort
to hold the Diocese of Providence, a Rhode Island corporation
sole, liable for acts of agents of the Home.93
The Rhode Island Supreme Court set forth the alter ego
doctrine as follows:
Although the criteria for piercing the corporate veil of limited
liability vary with the particular circumstances of each case, one
overriding factor is omnipresent: the corporate entity should be
disregarded and treated as an association of persons only when
the facts of a particular case render it unjust and inequitable to
consider the subject corporation a separate entity. Such facts
may be present, for example, when the corporate entity 'is used
to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or
defend crime. When a parent-subsidiary relationship is
involved, we have stated that in order to impose liability on a
parent corporation for the torts of its subsidiary, it must be
demonstrated that the parent dominated the finances, policies,
and practices of the subsidiary. On the other hand, when two
corporations are connected through common-stock ownership,
we will respect the separateness of each entity unless the
totality of circumstances surrounding their relationship
indicates that one of the corporations is so organized and
controlled, and its affairs are so conducted, as to make it merely
an instrumentality, agency, conduit, or adjunct of the other.
The burden of proof in corporate-veil-piercing cases rests upon
the party asking the court to disregard the corporate entity and
impose liability on some other party.94
The Court then held "that these above-stated principles" derived
from the law of business corporations applied to the religious
corporations at bar.95
91 Id. at 45-46
92 Id. at 45.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 48-49 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
95 Id. at 49; see also Medlock v. Medlock, 642 N.W.2d 113, 126 (Neb. 2002)
(holding in a divorce proceeding that a nonprofit religious corporation operated by
the ex-husband was the ex-husband's alter ego and that the corporation's assets
therefore should have been included in the marital estate for purposes of dividing
the couple's property); Goldstein v. Scott, 439 N.E.2d 1039, 1048 (Ill. App. 1982)
(finding that a church was the alter ego a separately incorporated ministry).
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Although the precise statement of the relevant standard
differs from one state to another, in all states the two basic issues
are those identified by the Gelineau court, namely: (1) such a
high degree of control that the various entities have effectively
lost their separate existence, and (2) the abuse of that control in
a way deemed unjust or inequitable. In a leading precedent, Pan
Pacific Sash & Door Co. v. Greendale Park, Inc.,96 the promoters
of a real estate venture split the business into two corporations:
one that owned the land and one that was to provide construction
services. 97 The land corporation had all the assets, while the
construction company incurred all the debts.98 Plaintiff was a
supplier who sold building materials to the construction
corporation. 99 When the debt was not paid, he attempted to
reach the assets of the land corporation. The court allowed
plaintiff to do so, setting forth a standard for invoking enterprise
liability requiring a two-pronged showing: (1) such a high degree
of unity of interest between the two entities that their separate
existence had de facto ceased and (2) that treating the two
entities as separate would promote injustice. 100
B. Application of the First Prong to a Diocese and Separately
Incorporated Juridic Persons
As applied to the typical sex abuse case, the first prong of the
alter ego standard will require a showing that the diocese
exercised such a high degree of control over separately
incorporated parishes that the latter effectively had no separate
existence. In Part I of this Article, we saw that canon law treats
each juridic person as separate, owning its own ecclesiastical
Adaptation of doctrines developed in the context of business corporations to the non-
profit context is common. Many non-profit corporation statutes, for example, rely
heavily on the business corporation statute model for guidance. See Gerstenblith,
supra note 53, at 440. As a result, courts generally do not "treat the corporation sole
differently than other legal structures." Id. at 460.
96 333 P.2d 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958); see also HAROLD MARSH, JR. & R. ROY
FINKLE, MARSH'S CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW 1416 (3d ed. 1990) ("The Pan
Pacific case may be considered to have adopted the so-called 'enterprise entity
theory'....").
97 Pan Pacific, 333 P.2d at 805-06.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 805.
100 See id. at 806; see also Las Palmas Assocs. v. Las Palmas Ctr. Assocs., 1 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 301, 318 (Ct. App. 1991) (adopting the Pan Pacific standard in an explicitly
enterprise liability theory case).
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property, and being administered by the local parish priest (or
comparable official). While the diocese possesses some powers of
taxation, regulation, and oversight, the separate personhood of
each juridic person is a foundational principle of the canon laws
governing the organization of the Church.
Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich'01 that the First Amendment's
religion clauses require civil courts to "defer to the result reached
by the highest authority within the church,"102 it appears highly
unlikely that courts will defer to canon law in applying the first
prong of the alter ego doctrine. In General Council on Finance &
Administration, United Methodist Church v. California Superior
Court,10 3 the General Council was named as one of several
defendants in a California state court case in which plaintiffs had
brought securities fraud and contract claims in connection with
the failure of a California corporation. 10 4 Plaintiffs claimed that
the General Council, which was an Illinois not-for-profit
corporation, was the failed corporation's alter ego.105 After a
hearing, in which the California trial court considered evidence
about the General Council's "role in the structure of the
Methodist Church," including "testimony of church officials and
experts and statements set forth in the Book of Discipline, which
contains the constitution and bylaws of the Methodist Church,"
the court rejected the General Council's motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction.'0 6  After the California appellate courts
declined to intervene, the case landed before then-Justice
William Rehnquist. In denying the General Council's request for
a stay pending review of its petition for certiorari, Rehnquist
stated that:
[A]pplicant plainly is wrong when it asserts that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prevent a civil court from
independently examining, and making the ultimate decision
regarding, the structure and actual operation of a hierarchical
church and its constituent units in an action such as this.
101 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
102 Nathan Clay Belzer, Deference in the Judicial Resolution of Intrachurch
Disputes: The Lesser of Two Constitutional Evils, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 109, 112
(1998).
103 439 U.S. 1369 (1978).
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There are constitutional limitations on the extent to which a
civil court may inquire into and determine matters of
ecclesiastical cognizance and polity in adjudicating intrachurch
disputes. But this Court never has suggested that those
constraints similarly apply outside the context of such intra-
organization disputes. Thus, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese
and the other cases cited by applicant are not in point. Those
cases are premised on a perceived danger that in resolving
intrachurch disputes the State will become entangled in
essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of
groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs. Such
considerations are not applicable to purely secular disputes
between third parties and a particular defendant, albeit a
religious affiliated organization, in which fraud, breach of
contract, and statutory violations are alleged.10 7
Although Rehnquist did not speak for the full court, the
distinction he drew between intra-church disputes, where courts
must defer to canon law, and disputes between the Church and
some third party, where courts need not do so, likely would be
followed by courts applying the alter ego doctrine in priest sex
abuses cases. 08
In Medlock v. Medlock,109  for example, the Nebraska
Supreme Court was asked to invoke the alter ego doctrine in a
case arising out of a divorce proceeding. 110 The ex-wife claimed
that assets of a religious nonprofit corporation operated should
be treated as part of the marital estate for purposes of dividing
their property.1 The ex-husband claimed that doing so would
violate his rights under the First Amendment religion clauses. 112
The court disagreed, holding that "application of general rules of
family law and corporate law to a situation involving a religious
corporation offends neither the Establishment Clause nor the
Free Exercise Clause.' ' 3
107 Id. at 1372-73 (citations omitted).
108 Cf. In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 335 B.R. 842, 852-53 (Bankr. D. Or.
2005) (following Rehnquist's opinion in determining which assets were within the
diocese's bankruptcy estate).
109 642 N.W.2d 113 (Neb. 2002).
110 Id. at 124.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 128.
113 Id. at 129. The assumption that courts will not treat canon law as controlling
the analysis under the first prong of the alter ego doctrine finds additional support
in a closely-related body of law arising out of car accidents involving priests. See
generally Marianne Perciaccante, The Courts and Canon Law, 6 CORNELL J.L. &
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In applying the civil law alter ego doctrine, courts thus are
likely to look to the laundry list of factual considerations
identified as relevant by secular corporation law rather than the
principles of canon law. 114 A short version of such a list was used
in the Pan Pacific case, in which the California court imposed
enterprise liability on two corporations because: (1) both
corporations were half of a single venture; (2) they had the same
shareholders, directors, and officers; (3) they occupied the same
premises; (4) they had common employees; and (5) neither was
adequately capitalized. 15  Applying this list to the typical
relationship of a diocese and separately incorporated parishes
suggests that alter ego liability should not be imposed. Although
both entities are part of a single Church, they serve very
different functions within the Church. 1 6 Typically, the diocese
and parish will occupy separate premises." 7 There may be some
overlap of employees, officers, and directors, but usually not
complete overlap; in particular, each parish priest is responsible
for administering parish assets.'18 As for capitalization issues,
they are discussed below." 9
PUB. POL'Y 171, 200-06 (1996). In these cases, plaintiffs have sometimes argued that
the priests in question were agents of the diocesan corporation sole, such that the
latter could be held vicariously liable in connection for the priests' conduct. Id. at
200-01. In order for an agency relationship to exist, of course, the principal must
exercise control over the agent. Typically, courts have held that the canon law
principles governing the bishop-priest relationship are not dispositive of that
question, instead applying a standard civil law of agency analysis to the facts at bar.
Id. at 202. Perciaccante explains that the sex abuse cases generally have not been
resolved under agency law principles because principals generally are not
vicariously liable for the intentional torts of their agents. Id. at 204. See generally
Mark E. Chopko, Ascending Liability of Religious Entities for the Actions of Others,
17 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 289, 317-19 (1993) (discussing liability of churches for
sexual misconduct by ministers).
114 See, e.g., United States v. Jon-T Chem., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir.
1985) ("In lieu of articulating a coherent doctrinal basis for the alter ego theory, we
have instead developed a laundry list of factors to be used in determining whether a
subsidiary is the alter ego of its parent.").
115 Pan Pac. Sash & Door Co. v. Greendale Park, Inc., 333 P.2d 802, 806 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1958).
116 See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (discussing functions of
diocese and parish).
117 See supra text accompanying note 38 (noting that dioceses are divided into
multiple geographic parts).
118 See supra text accompanying note 39.
119 See infra part II.B.3.
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A much longer version of the laundry list was set out in
Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co. 120:
A review of the cases which have discussed the problem
discloses the consideration of a variety of factors which were
pertinent to the trial court's determination under the particular
circumstances of each case. Among these are the following:
[1] Commingling of funds and other assets, failure to segregate
funds of the separate entities, and the unauthorized diversion of
corporate funds or assets to other than corporate uses; [2] the
treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as
his own; [3] the failure to obtain authority to issue stock or to
subscribe to or issue the same; [4] the holding out by an
individual that he is personally liable for the debts of the
corporation; [5] the failure to maintain minutes or adequate
corporate records, and the confusion of the records of the
separate entities; [6] the identical equitable ownership in the
two entities; [7] the identification of the equitable owners
thereof with the domination and control of the two entities;
[81 identification of the directors and officers of the two entities
in the responsible supervision and management; [9] sole
ownership of all of the stock in a corporation by one individual
or the members of a family; [10] the use of the same office or
business location; [11] the employment of the same employees
and/or attorney; [12] the failure to adequately capitalize a
corporation; [13] the total absence of corporate assets and
undercapitalization; [14] the use of a corporation as a mere
shell, instrumentality or conduit for a single venture or the
business of an individual or another corporation; [15] the
concealment and misrepresentation of the identity of the
responsible ownership, management and financial interest, or
concealment of personal business activities; [16] the disregard of
legal formalities and the failure to maintain arm's length
relationships among related entities; [17] the use of the
corporate entity to procure labor, services or merchandise for
another person or entity; [18] the diversion of assets from a
corporation by or to a stockholder or other person or entity, to
the detriment of creditors, or the manipulation of assets and
liabilities between entities so as to concentrate the assets in one
and the liabilities in another; [19] the contracting with another
with intent to avoid performance by use of a corporate entity as
a shield against personal liability, or the use of a corporation as
a subterfuge of illegal transactions; [20] and the formation and
120 26 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Ct. App. 1962).
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use of a corporation to transfer to it the existing liability of
another person or entity.121
The task of applying this unwieldy list was not simplified by the
court's failure to provide guidance as to how the factors should be
weighted or balanced; the court merely observed that in all prior
California cases in which the veil had been pierced "several of the
factors mentioned were present."122
In adapting the business corporation standard to
corporations sole and other not-for-profit religious corporations,
some of the Associated Vendors factors obviously must be
disregarded. For example, the question of "identical equitable
ownership in the two entities" is irrelevant because the entities
in question here do not have owners. Likewise, some of the
factors will have to be adapted to fit this rather different
situation. Yet, even so, it seems possible to identify several
different Associated Vendors factors that are more-or-less directly
relevant to the relationship of a diocese to separately
incorporated parishes.
1. Control by the Bishop
One obvious issue suggested by the Associated Vendors list,
especially the fifth through eleventh factors, is the extent to
which the diocesan bishop controls the day to day affairs of the
parishes. "Actual domination, rather than the opportunity to
exercise control, must be shown."123
Data collected by Professor Robert Thompson from cases
involving business corporations suggests that courts are likely to
deem two (or more) entities to be alter egos where they share
common business activities or have common employees. 124
Thompson found that courts were less likely to do so where the
entities had common directors and officers, and thus concluded
that "courts are looking beyond the formal overlap of
shareholders, directors, and officers to see if businesses show
other signs of intertwining between the corporation and the
121 Id. at 813-15 (citations omitted and enumeration added).
122 Id. at 815.
123 Williams v. McAllister Bros., 534 F.2d 19, 21 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Berger v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 453 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1972)).
124 Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1064 (1991) (finding piercing rates of eighty-one percent and
sixty-nine percent, respectively).
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shareholder."1 25 Because a parish administered in accordance
with the dictates of canon law generally will be engaged in
different religious activities than the diocese and will be
administered by the local priest rather than diocesan officials,
this factor will weigh against deeming the parish and diocese to
be alter egos.1 26
Although there are only a handful of directly relevant
precedents, the case law involving alter ego claims against
Catholic diocese is consistent with that prediction. In Doe v.
Gelineau,127 for example, the diocesan bishop served as the
president and treasurer, and as director, of the Home. The court,
however, held that enterprise liability should not be imposed
merely because the same individual holds offices in both
entities.128 Instead, the plaintiffs were required to show that the
bishop "so organized and controlled" the Home's business and
operations that the Home "was nothing more than a mere
instrumentality of' the bishop. 129 As the court colloquially put it,
however, plaintiffs were unable even to show that the bishop
"was wearing his [diocesan] hat when he took any actions
concerning" the Home. 130 Accordingly, the court declined to
impose liability on an alter ego theory.
Presumably, the bishop's canon law supervisory and
oversight duties with respect to juridic persons within the diocese
did not require a contrary finding. As we saw above, although
the diocesan bishop possesses legislative, executive, and judicial
power within his diocese, canon law entrusts the administration
of the parish to the local priest.1 31 So long as the diocesan bishop
125 Id.
126 It is generally possible under civil law for an incorporated diocese to have an
independent board of directors. See Manny, supra note 82, at 12. The existence of
such a board would negate a number of the Associated Vendors factors relating to
control.
127 732 A.2d 43 (R.I. 1999); see also supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
128 Gelineau, 732 A.2d at 49 (citing Landry v. St. Charles Inn, Inc. 446 So. 2d
1246, 1251 (La. Ct. App. 1984)); see also Custer Builders, Inc. v. Quaker Heritage,
Inc., 41 A.D.2d 448, 451, 344 N.Y.S.2d 606, 609 (3d Dep't 1973); Richfood, Inc. v.
Jennings, 499 S.E.2d 272, 276 (Va. 1998)).
129 Id. (citing Vucci v. Meyers Bros. Parking Sys., 494 A.2d 530, 536 (R.I. 1985)).
130 Id. at 50.
131 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. Hence, in canon law, ordinary
administration of the parish, which is defined as "the day-to-day direction of a
parish," is assigned to the parish priest. O'Brien, supra note 63, at 121 (citing CODEX
IURIS CANONICI cc.527-30 (Canon Law Soc'y of Am. trans., 1998)).
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respects that canonical distinction, it is difficult to argue that the
parish is a mere instrumentality of the diocese.
Taeger v. Catholic Family and Community Services132
confirms this conclusion. In this case, adoptive parents brought
suit against a Catholic adoption agency for failing to disclose
medical information about the birth mother. 133 The parents also
sought to hold the diocese liable on an alter ego theory. 13 4 The
court held that the parents would have to show that the diocese
exercised "substantially total control over the management and
activities of' the adoption agency in order to succeed.13 5  In
addition, the parents would have to show that the diocese
"actually exercise[d] this control so that the [agency] bec[ame] 'a
mere instrumentality.' "136
There were a number of indicia of diocesan control over the
agency. For example, the two entities prepared consolidated
financial statements; the Bishop had some control of who was
appointed to the agency's board of directors; agency real estate
had been titled as property of the diocesan corporation sole and
the financial statements treated agency assets as unrestricted
assets of the diocese; the financial statements referred to the
agency as a "part of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Phoenix"; and
the bishop was responsible for ensuring that the agency followed
"the principles of the Roman Catholic faith."' 37 Despite these
various indicia of diocesan control over CFCS, however, the court
found that there was no "control over day-to-day operations, but
only... an ability to control the board and the policies of
CFCS."' 38 Accordingly, the court declined to hold that the agency
was the diocese's alter ego.
Because the control exercised by the Phoenix bishop over the
adoption agency appears to have been consistent with the
standards of canon law, a diocesan bishop who adheres to those
standards in exercising control over the juridic persons within
his jurisdiction can take substantial comfort from the Taeger
132 995 P.2d 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
133 Id. at 724.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 733 (quoting Gatecliff v. Great Republic Life Ins. Co., 821 P.2d 725,
728 (Ariz. 1991)).
136 Id. at 734 (quoting Oldenburger v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 765 P.2d 531, 536
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decision. To be sure, the court did not defer to the canon law in
making its decision; indeed, the court did not even reference
canon law in this regard. The decision, however, at least
implicitly suggests that alter ego liability will not be imposed
even though a diocesan bishop exerts the degree of control over a
separately incorporated juridic person necessary to satisfy the
bishop's duty under canon law. Specifically, the bishop's
obligation to "exercise careful vigilance" over ecclesiastical goods
within his diocese, to foster observance of the laws of the Church
regarding the administration of temporal goods, to "protect the
unity of the universal Church" by promoting "common
discipline," and to urge the "observance of all ecclesiastical
laws." 139 Conversely, of course, a diocesan bishop who routinely
meddles in parish administration not only violates canon law,
but also renders both the diocese and its parishes vulnerable to
joint liability on an alter ego theory.
Some claimants may argue for drawing a distinction between
cases like Taeger and the priest sex abuse scandals based on the
nature of the misconduct in question. In Taeger, the court
emphasized that, "[t]o the extent the Bishop exercised any
control over [the agency], it was ecclesiastical in nature and not
substantive control over [the agency's] business operations." 140
Under canon law, a parish priest is appointed by the diocesan
bishop. If the priest selected by the bishop goes on to abuse a
parishioner, it may be argued that the bishop exercised sufficient
control to satisfy this set of factors.
If made, such an argument should not prevail. The question
is not merely whether the bishop exercises a power of
appointment, but rather whether the bishop's control over parish
and priestly functions is so extensive as to render the parish his
"mere instrumentality."14' In addition, this argument conflates
the issue of direct liability of the corporation sole for the bishop's
decision to appoint an abuser-priest, such as where it is claimed
the bishop did so negligently, with alter ego liability. Claims
139 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (outlining a diocesan bishop's
duties under canon law).
140 Taeger, 995 P.2d at 735.
141 Cf. Plate v. St. Mary's Help of Christians Church, 520 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn.
App. 1994) (declining to impose agency-law-based vicarious liability on a diocese for
actions of a parish where "the Bishop has the exclusive power to hire and fire parish
priests and the exclusive power to open and close parishes ... [but] has nothing to
do with the operation of the parish itself.").
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premised on the bishop's power of appointment thus should not
result in the diocese and its parishes being deemed one another's
alter egos. 142
2. Financial Ties
A second relevant set of considerations relate to financial
dealings between the affiliated entities. Although the Gelineau
court emphasized the lack of financial and business ties between
the diocese and the Home, noting that the former did not provide
"any financial support" to the latter, 143 the Associated Vendors
factors do not compel a finding of alter ego liability simply
because there are financial transactions between the entities in
question.
In Taeger, for example, plaintiff offered expert testimony
showing that the adoption agency's assets were treated as
unrestricted diocesan assets in the entities' combined financial
statements.144 In addition, there was evidence the agency "used
personnel forms and other personnel services of the Diocese." 145
Finally, the agency received some modest financial support from
a diocesan charity. Despite these financial and personnel
connections, the court declined to treat the agency as the
diocese's alter ego.
Financial relationships become problematic only when they
rise to the level of commingling of funds, the diversion of assets
to non-corporate purposes, and the like.146 As non-profit entities,
dioceses and separately incorporated parishes must comply with
the tax law principles against private inurement, private benefit,
and excess benefits,1 47 which collectively proscribe non-arm's
length transactions and thus provide a legal structure insuring
against the sort of problematic transactions that might trigger
alter ego liability. Where the various entities further respect
their separate corporate identities by acting as independent
entities, maintaining separate corporate records, and properly
142 Such claims also would raise a greater possibility of judicial entanglement in
the appointment and disciplinary decisions of the church hierarchy, which would
raise special First Amendment concerns. See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 5, at 45
(discussing the problem of judicial entanglement).
143 Doe v. Gelineau, 732 A.2d 43, 51 (R.I. 1999).
144 Taeger, 995 P.2d at 734.
145 Id.
146 See supra text accompanying note 121.
147 See Manny, supra note 82, at 5-12 (discussing these doctrines).
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recording and accounting for related party financial transactions,
courts should not invoke the alter ego doctrine. 148
This prediction finds support in Thompson's data from
business corporation cases. Thompson found, for example, that
courts declined to pierce the corporate veil in 99% of the cases in
which the court expressly noted that there were no facts to
suggest a lack of substantive separation between the entities.
149
Likewise, courts declined to pierce in almost 95% of the cases in
which they noted the absence of facts suggesting that the parties
had failed to observe the corporate formalities. 150 These results
are to be contrasted to cases in which the court found that there
was no substantive separation between the entities or that the
parties had failed to observe the corporate formalities, in which
courts pierced the veil 85% and 67% of the time, respectively.
1 51
These results confirm that due regard for the formal separation
of the parish and diocese, as mandated by canon law, should
provide substantial secular legal protection against alter ego
claims.152
3. Undercapitalization
A third consideration suggested by the Associated Vendors
list is whether the diocese is adequately capitalized. In cases
involving business corporations, courts pierce the corporate veil
in over 73% of cases in which they conclude that the corporation
148 Cf. In re Bowen Transports, Inc., 551 F.2d 171, 179 (7th Cir. 1977) (declining
to pierce the veil of Delaware and Illinois business corporations owned by a common
parent corporation and having identical officers and directors of all three
corporations where the corporations acted as separate and independent entities,
separate corporate records were maintained, and financial transactions between the
corporations were recorded in the respective corporate ledgers).
149 Thompson, supra note 124, at 1064-65 n.141.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 1063 tbl. 11.
152 See Manny, supra note 82, at 17-18 ("A... step in maintaining distinct legal
entities is to respect what will be termed 'corporate niceties.' This involves proper
corporate maintenance achieved by following the requirements of state law. A non-
profit religious organization should properly draft certificates or articles of
incorporation and by-laws; maintain adequate records required under state and
federal law; file properly prepared and reviewed annual reports; hold regular board
meetings; and draft, review and approve minutes of those meetings. Furthermore,
financial statements of the organization should be reviewed and approved by all
officers and directors. These items provide the necessary papertrail to legitimize the
organization's corporate existence in those situations where it is challenged.").
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was undercapitalized, 153 while they decline to pierce in over 94%
of cases in which the firm was not undercapitalized. 154
While undercapitalization is one factor courts commonly
consider that may result in personal liability when taken in
conjunction with the factors we discussed earlier, it is not enough
standing alone to result in enterprise liability for the diocese and
its parishes. 155  Instead, "some 'wrong' beyond a creditor's
inability to collect" must be shown before the entities in question
are deemed alter egos of one another. 156 As such, the inability of
the diocese to satisfy the claims of its creditors is not sufficient to
justify treating the diocese and its affiliated juridic persons as
alter egos, nor is it conclusive evidence that the diocese itself was
undercapitalized.
Courts have articulated various standards for determining
whether an entity was undercapitalized for purposes of the alter
ego doctrine. In Arizona, for example, the corporation's financial
situation must be "a sham," meaning that "the amount of capital
must be illusory or trifling."157 In South Dakota and Nebraska,
undercapitalization "means capitalization very small in relation
153 Thompson, supra note 124, at 1063 tbl.11.
154 Id. at 1064-65 n.141.
155 See, e.g., Gartner v. Snyder, 607 F.2d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Although
Enterprises was thinly capitalized, that alone is not a sufficient ground for
disregarding the corporate form. We know of no New York authority that disregards
corporate form solely because of inadequate capitalization.").
156 Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1991),
aff'd, 993 F.2d 1309 (1993). Although the case Minton v. Cavaney, 364 P.2d 473,
474-76 (Cal. 1961), is usually cited for the proposition that undercapitalization alone
suffices, this is arguably an inaccurate reading of that case. In Minton, the
California Supreme Court found that a director of a swimming pool management
company could be held personally liable for its debts because of the fact that his
outlay of capital was "trifling" when compared to the substantial risks posed by
conducting that kind of business. Id. at 475 (internal quotation marks omitted). This
finding, however, was undoubtedly supported by additional circumstances including
the director's own statement that although the corporation "was duly organized," it
had "never functioned as a corporation." Id. at 474. Thus, only when the corporation
was admittedly a sham did undercapitalization amount to the requisite "abuse of the
corporate privilege" that the court stated would trigger application of the alter ego
doctrine. Id. at 475-76. In any event, this case probably is no longer good law even
in its home jurisdiction. See Arnold v. Browne, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783 (Ct. App.
1972) (treating undercapitalization as merely a relevant, but not dispositive, factor);
Harris v. Curtis, 87 Cal. Rptr. 614, 617 (Ct. App. 1970) (rejecting the argument
"that, per se, inadequate capitalization renders the shareholders.., liable for the
obligations of the corporation").
157 Keams v. Tempe Technical Inst., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 714, 724 (D. Ariz. 1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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to the nature of the business of the corporation and the risks the
business entails measured at the time of formation."'158 In
California, the Associated Vendors list asks whether there was a
"total absence of corporate assets."1 59 Another oft-cited standard,
albeit one that originated in a dissent, asks whether "a
corporation vested with a public interest" was "organized with
capital insufficient to meet liabilities which are certain to arise in
the ordinary course of the corporation's business." 160 There are
common themes running through all of these tests. Either the
founders of the business put funds into the corporation at the
outset that were clearly insufficient to satisfy existing
contractual and likely tort obligations or they have drained all
profits out of the firm in the form of dividends or salaries paid to
the controlling shareholders, leaving it with insufficient reserves
to meet its likely obligations. Of particular relevance to dioceses
facing the enormous claims brought by priest sex abuse victims 16'
is an exception that provides that courts will not invoke the alter
ego doctrine "where initially adequate finances dwindle under
the pressure of competition, bad times or extraordinary and
unexpected liability."'62
C. Application of the Second Factor
Recall that the second prong of the alter ego standard
requires the plaintiff to show that treating the entities in
question as separate legal personalities would lead to an unjust
or inequitable result. This vague standard gives judges little
guidance but wide discretion.' 63  The leading treatise on
158 Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ross, 521 N.W.2d 107, 115 (S.D. 1994) (quoting
Global Credit Servs. v. AMISUB, 508 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Neb. 1993)).
159 Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813-15 (Ct.
App. 1962).
160 Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 427, 223 N.E.2d 6, 14, 276 N.Y.S.2d
585, 595 (1966) (Keating, J., dissenting).
161 An anecdotal example of the size of the potential liabilities relative to
diocesan assets is offered by a Dallas case "where a jury awarded $120 million to
victims of an abusive priest. In that case, the plaintiffs (former altar boys) reportedly
settled for about $30 million rather than force the church into what probably would
have been a lengthy bankruptcy." Brad Knickerbocker, What Happens When a
Church Goes Bankrupt, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 9, 2004, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0709/p02sO1-usju.html.
162 Walkovszky, 18 N.Y.2d at 427, 223 N.E.2d at 13, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 595-96
(Keating, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
163 "A trial court's ruling on such questions will be regarded as presumptively
correct and will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous." Cheatle v.
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California corporate law states that California's standard
"merely measures the rule by the length of the Chancellor's foot.
The generalized phrases, 'sanction a fraud or promote injustice,'
are useless in predicting the outcome of a particular case." 164
Benjamin Cardozo more succinctly complained that veil piercing
is a doctrine "enveloped in the mists of metaphor."165 Instead of
reasoned analysis, courts typically fall back on what has been
variously characterized as analysis by epithet and "reason[ing]
by pejorative." 166
Particularly in the context of the priest sex abuse litigation,
where the behavior of many diocesan bishops has been sharply
criticized, a judge or jury seeking to do rough justice may be
tempted to simply slap the epithet "alter ego" on the diocese and
its parishes. Yet, there are a number of doctrinal and policy
reasons why courts should undertake a more thoughtful analysis.
In doing so, the following considerations should receive
particular emphasis.
1. An Unsatisfied Judgment Is Not Enough
The mere fact that separate incorporation of the diocese and
its parishes may result in insufficient assets to satisfy claims
against the diocesan corporation sole is simply not enough to
justify treating separately incorporated parishes as the diocese's
alter egos. The prospect of an unsatisfied claim thus is not
enough to meet the second prong of the alter ego test.1 67 After
all, why would a plaintiff invoke the doctrine if the corporation
had enough assets to satisfy the claim?1 68
Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply Co., Inc., 360 S.E.2d 828, 831 (Va. 1987).
164 MARSH & FINKLE, supra note 96, at 1392.
165 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94-95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
166 Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of
Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV.
853, 855 (1997); see also PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS:
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 8
(1983) (using terms "metaphor or epithet").
167 Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 816 (Ct.
App. 1962) ("[I]t is not sufficient to merely show that a creditor will remain
unsatisfied if the corporate veil is not pierced ... ").
168 A closely related doctrine proscribes the invocation of alter ego principles so
as to increase the size of a punitive damages award. See Walker v. Signal Cos., 149
Cal. Rptr. 119, 129 (Ct. App. 1978) ("The sole basis for holding [the parent] liable
would be to enable the plaintiffs to obtain an increased award of punitive damages
because of the substantial net worth of the parent. There is no factual justification to
do so.").
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2. Impact on the Exercise-of Religion
Although it does not violate the First Amendment religion
clauses for courts to invoke the alter ego doctrine in this context,
the broad discretion given courts under the second prong of the
standard makes it appropriate for courts to consider the impact
of imposing alter ego-based liability on separately incorporated
parishes and other religious entities. First, determining that a
parish and a diocese are alter egos requires a court to disregard
the canon law basis of separate incorporation and, moreover, may
entangle the court in attempting to determine whether or not the
diocesan bishop's conduct met the requirements of those laws.
Inevitably, in such an inquiry it will be difficult to cabin the
secular and the religious. Put another way, when a religious
organization has chosen a particular legal structure so as to
optimally conform its existence as a civil law organization to the
church's teachings on hierarchy and structure, the church has
made a decision that inextricably mixes the secular and the
divine. Furthermore, the ongoing operation of the incorporated
ministry requires compliance with canon law and Church
doctrine. When a court disregards the structural and operational
choices made by the diocese or parish by invoking the alter ego
doctrine, even when done using nominally neutral principles, it
necessarily becomes entangled in evaluating the manner in
which the church has chosen to exercise its religion.
This concern seems especially pertinent given the historical
context. The Catholic Church in the United States commonly
chose a civil law structure that conformed poorly to the dictates
of canon law-an incorporated diocese and unincorporated
parishes whose property was nominally owned by the diocesan
corporation-so as to solve the theological problem presented by
the trusteeism movement. Once liability concerns took
precedence, the Church began to reorganize its civil law
structure by separately incorporating parishes and other juridic
persons affiliated with the various dioceses. In doing so, the
Church not only sought to avail itself of the civil law benefit of
limited liability, but also brought its civil law structure into
greater conformity with the canon law governing ownership of
property by juridic persons. Invoking the alter ego doctrine so as
to deprive the Church of the civil law shield of limited liability
associated with separate incorporation thus inevitably implicates
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theological questions associated with the Church's canonical
structure.
This concern is particularly relevant to application of the
alter ego doctrine. As we have seen, the doctrine rests in the first
instance on questions of control. Yet, a certain degree of
episcopal control over parishes is inherent in the theological and
canonical structure of the Catholic Church:
[T]he Church is organized around the principle of apostolic
succession. Bishops are not just managers. They are not
accountable to congregations in the way pastors are in the
Protestant tradition. They carry unique moral and spiritual
authority, and have an ancient juridical status within canon
law. While the People of God includes all of us, and not just the
hierarchy, as laity our authority in the Church is limited, and
not just with respect to doctrinal matters or sacramental
functions. Our role in governance of dioceses and parishes has
always been highly circumscribed .... 169
Evaluating whether a Bishop improperly dominates a separately
incorporated parish thus inevitably entangles a court with that
"unique moral and spiritual authority" and also with the Bishop's
"ancient juridical status within canon law."170
One might also take into account the impact of such a
decision on the members of the church. In many dioceses, there
are hundreds of separate juridic persons, each ministering to
numerous worshippers and even non-Church members. If a
court were to treat all of those juridic persons as alter egos of the
diocese, the assets of many parishes and other ministries that
had no connection with priest sex abuse would be made available
to satisfy the claims of sex abuse plaintiffs. Inevitably, execution
of a judgment against their assets would impede-if not
destroy-the ability of these ministries to serve the needs of their
congregants. Indeed, the mere threat of liability might do so.
"Both church and society will suffer if the continuation of
ministries prompted by compassion-ministries often involving
risks-is stopped short by the nervous calculation of legal
liabilities."171
169 Sargent, supra note 4, at 428-29.
170 Id.
171 EDWARD M. GAFFNEY, JR. & PHILIP C. SORENSEN, ASCENDING LIABILITY IN
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS viii-ix (Howard R. Griffin ed., 1984).
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In turn, the impact of such liability-or even the risk of such
liability-on parishioners inevitably redounds against the
Church. If parishioners come to believe that donations to their
local parish, which they expect to be used in the main for the
benefit of the local church and its ministries, are being siphoned
off to pay diocesan claims and legal bills, their attitude towards
giving to the support of the parish will inevitably sour. In turn,
this is likely to impact the morale and effectiveness of the parish
priest and other local church workers, whose morale may already
be in doubt due to the threat to their retirement and health
benefits. Hence:
[R]eligious entities, like their secular counterparts, need the
assurance that "corporate" independence will be respected.
Religious entities, to a greater extent than their secular entities,
rely on the unbridled goodwill of volunteers to make their
operations run. Occasionally, religious entities seek to
structure their operations as separate civil units to guard
against the possibility that one unit (or the whole body) might
be made more vulnerable by the actions of an individual acting
on its behalf or even alone. Having chosen to plan operations in
a particular way following the dictates of the civil law, religious
entities should not bear the risk that these "corporate"
structures will be imploded in litigation. 172
To be clear, the point is not that application of the alter ego
doctrine to religious corporations is unconstitutional. The law is
quite definitely to the contrary.173 The point is only that the
broad equitable discretion of courts in applying the alter ego
doctrine ought to include consideration of the impact on the
ability of innocent Church members to freely exercise their
religion.
3. Why and When Did the Juridic Persons Separately
Incorporate?
There is nothing intrinsically fraudulent about deciding to
incorporate or about dividing a single enterprise into multiple
corporations. 174 Accordingly, incorporating an entity so as to get
the benefit of limited liability by itself neither promotes injustice
172 Chopko, supra note 113, at 293-94.
173 See supra notes 101-113 and accompanying text.
174 See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 420-21, 223 N.E.2d 6, 10, 276
N.Y.S.2d 585, 590-91 (1966).
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nor sanctions a fraud: "[T]he law permits the incorporation of
businesses for the very purpose of isolating liabilities among
separate entities. Since society recognizes the benefits of
allowing persons and organizations to limit their business risks
through incorporation, sound public policy dictates that
disregard of those separate corporate entities be approached with
caution."175  Instead, there must be some element of unjust
enrichment for the second prong to be satisfied. 176
Medlock v. Medlock 177 nicely illustrates the sort of facts in
which the requisite wrong is typically found to exist. Buddy and
Linda Medlock were divorcing. Their assets previously had been
transferred to Union Oaks, Inc., a Nebraska nonprofit religious
corporation, which was operated by Buddy. Union Oaks
"provided Buddy with a parsonage, the use of various vehicles,
and a salary."178  The court determined that Union Oaks was
Buddy's alter ego, noting that:
Buddy made extensive personal use of corporate funds and
assets and that Buddy carried on personal dealings in the name
of the corporation. The record shows a nearly complete unity of
interest between Buddy and Union Oaks. Buddy exercised
nearly unfettered control of Union Oaks and regularly
purchased vehicles, travel, and other goods and services in the
corporate name for his family's personal use. 179
Not to include the religious corporation's assets in the marital
estate for purposes of dividing Buddy and Linda's property thus
would have worked a serious injustice to the latter.
Most priest sex abuses cases are unlikely to entail conduct
by diocesan bishops resembling that of Buddy. Instead, the more
likely scenario is illustrated by a 2004 article in the Christian
Science Monitor, which reported that "the Roman Catholic
Diocese of Tucson had sold or transferred assets worth $5 million
to other Catholic corporations over the past year. Church
officials said this was part of normal church business, as well as
a way to pay off abuse settlements from two years ago."180
175 Pacific Landmark Hotel, Ltd. v. Marriott Hotels, Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 555,
563 (Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted).
176 Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 522, 524 (7th Cir.
1991), aff'd, 993 F.2d 1309, 1311-12 (1993).
177 642 N.W.2d 113 (Neb. 2002).
178 Id. at 119.
179 Id. at 125.
180 Knickerbocker, supra note 161.
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Litigants described the sales "as a way of avoiding compensation
for abuse."181
Because the diocese and its parishes should not be deemed
alter egos simply because the former has insufficient assets to
satisfy creditor claims,18 2 the question of when the entities in
question were separately incorporated ought to loom larger than
the question of why they were so incorporated when courts
analyze the relationship between a diocese and affiliated,
separately incorporated juridic persons. In a Massachusetts
diocese, for example, separately incorporated parishes date back
to the 1870s.18 3 In Rhode Island, a nonprofit corporation holding
Church-related assets was set up more than 100 years ago,18 4 and
the Providence Diocese incorporated most of its parishes in the
early to mid-1900s.'8 5 Because decades-old separate incorporation
of juridic persons hardly can be characterized as an attempt by
the Church to escape liability in the current sex abuse cases, it is
difficult to see how courts could find that respecting the separate
legal personality of such entities promotes fraud or sanctions
injustice, as the second prong requires.
In contrast, where a diocese only began separately
incorporating parishes and other juridic persons after the priest
sex abuse litigation began, the case for treating the diocese and
such persons as alter egos becomes stronger. The case becomes
even stronger if the diocesan bishop (or his predecessors) engaged
in the various forms of misconduct identified by the National
Review Board, including cover ups, continuing to assign known
abusers to parish ministries, failure to punish repeat offenders,
and the like.186 As a California court put it in a case involving
business corporations, "it would be unjust to permit those who
control companies to treat them as a single or unitary enterprise
181 Id.
182 See supra Part II.C.1.
183 McCarthy, supra note 15, at 124.
184 Geyelin, supra note 18.
185 Levitz, supra note 20.
186 See NAT'L REVIEW BD. FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN & YOUNG PEOPLE,
A REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES 96-129
(2004), available at http://www.usccb.org/nrb/nrbstudy/nrbreport.pdf (describing
bishops' responses to sex abuse claims); see also O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 5, at
33-34 (detailing similar accusations against dioceses).
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and then assert their corporate separateness in order to commit
frauds and other misdeeds with impunity. 18 7
Yet, even with respect to such a diocese, there are still
arguments to be considered on the other side. First, treating
separately incorporated parishes as alter egos of the diocese
denies them the statutory protection of limited liability. As we
have seen, the law makes incorporation available as an option
precisely so that parties can avail themselves of that protection.
Alter ego thus takes back with one hand what the state has
granted with the other. Second, because treating separately
incorporated parishes as alter egos of the diocese would expose
the parishes' assets to the claims of diocesan creditors, even
though the parish in question might never have had any cases of
priest abuse, the ability of innocent parish priests and
parishioners to freely practice their religion may be adversely
affected. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the law
provides creditors with alternative remedies.
Where a diocese separately incorporates parishes and other
agencies and transfers assets to these newly formed entities in
hope of shielding those assets from creditors' claims, the law
provides creditors with a powerful tool: fraudulent transfer
law. 188 The law governing fraudulent transfers is complex,'8 9 but
has the virtue of being more squarely focused on the problematic
behavior than is veil piercing. Fraudulent transfer law does not
ask whether the entities observed various corporate formalities.
Instead, the actual fraud variant of fraudulent transfer law asks
whether the debtor transferred property with the intent to
hinder the creditor by putting collateral beyond reach.1 90 The
constructive fraud variant asks whether the debtor received less
than reasonably equivalent value for the property transferred
and was insolvent at the time of the transfer or rendered
187 Las Palmas Assocs. v. Las Palmas Ctr. Assocs., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301, 317 (Ct.
App. 1991).
188 See supra note 21.
189 Robert Clark pioneered the overlap between fraudulent transfer law and veil
piercing, contending that fraudulent conveyance principles shed valuable light on
veil piercing. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 39 (1986). At the same time,
however, he noted that the vague alter ego standards make it "easier for plaintiffs to
prove their cases, and they give judges more flexibility and discretion." Id. at 85. Our
argument is that it is precisely those aspects of alter ego law that justify applying it
sparingly, while leaving plaintiffs fraudulent transfer law as a remedy.
190 CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 420-22 (1997).
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insolvent by the transfer. 191 Admittedly, neither of these are
bright-line standards, but at least both are asking the right
questions. In contrast, most of the factors considered in alter ego
cases are "singularly lacking in direct relevance to the question of
the existence, and the amount, of harm caused the outside
creditor by the misbehavior of the controlling shareholder."19 2
D. The Basic Policy Rationale of the Alter Ego Doctrine
As a final analytical step, it seems appropriate to ask
whether the policy rationale for using the alter ego doctrine has
relevance to the problems posed by the priest sex abuse cases.
The alter ego doctrine developed as an equitable response to the
problematic incentives limited liability creates for the owners of
business corporations. In brief,193  limited liability allows
shareholders of a business corporation to externalize part of the
risks and costs of doing business onto other corporate
constituencies and, perhaps, even onto society at large. 194 By
setting aside the corporate veil in appropriate cases, the alter ego
doctrine forces shareholders to internalize at least some of those
costs. 195
191 Id. at 425.
192 CLARK, supra note 189, at 85.
193 For a more detailed treatment, see Bainbridge, supra note 88, at 480-84.
194 See, e.g., Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J.
CORP. L. 573, 576 (1986) ("[Elven economists convinced of the utility of limited
liability.., concede that limited liability raises serious problems because it enables
the enterprise to externalize its costs."); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort
Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1586 (1991) ("Limited liability does
not simply offset positive externalities, but rather encourages excessively risky
activity.").
195 Even if one assumes that some legal action is necessary to force diocesan
bishops to internalize the costs associated with risky behavior on their part of that of
their priests, the alter ego doctrine is an exceedingly blunt instrument for doing so.
As the author Bainbridge has explained elsewhere:
[T]here is no reason to believe that veil piercing causes equity claimants to
internalize the risks associated with their business' operations. Both in
rhetoric and application, the doctrine focuses on such irrelevancies as
observation of organizational formalities and not on whether the equity
claimants used their control to externalize risk. After all, it is clear that
courts will not pierce the veil whenever the defendant externalized some
costs onto third parties ....
It seems unlikely that veil piercing even inadvertently addresses concerns
over negative externalities. As our review of the doctrine demonstrated, the
law of veil piercing is remarkably vague. Indeed, the doctrine is nothing
more than analysis by epithet. As a result, application of the doctrine is
rare, unprincipled, and arbitrary....
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Even if one assumes that the religious activities of the
Catholic Church generate negative externalities comparable to
those associated with the business activities of civil corporations,
the policy rationale behind the alter ego doctrine seems inapt as
applied to the former. Diocesan bishops are already subject to a
variety of pressures to internalize the risk of priestly misconduct:
exposure of diocesan assets to liability, adverse media attention
that reflects poorly both on a bishop's personal reputation and
the Church he has taken a solemn sacramental oath to protect,
and intra-church discipline. 196 Treating a diocese and all its
affiliated juridic persons as a single religious enterprise for
purpose of imposing liability with respect to past errors is
therefore likely to impose significant costs on the ability of
innocent parishioners to freely exercise their religion without
significantly affecting the behavior of current bishops.
CONCLUSION
There is no constitutional bar to a court using the alter ego
doctrine to treat a diocese and its separately incorporated
parishes as a single enterprise for liability purposes in the priest
sex abuse scandal litigation (or any other dispute, for that
matter). The analysis in this paper, however, suggests that
appropriate cases for invoking the alter ego doctrine in this
context will be few and far between.
Two entities will be treated as alter egos where: (1) one
entity exercises such a high degree of control that the other has
effectively lost its separate existence, and (2) the controlling
entity has abused its power of control in an unjust or inequitable
manner. As to the former prong, a diocesan bishop who comports
Equity claimants of a limited liability entity, moreover, can very
effectively insulate themselves from veil piercing-based personal liability
by complying with minimal organizational formalities and providing
modest levels of capital and/or insurance. How can such a dysfunctional
doctrine possibly create appropriate incentives for the equity claimants of
either a corporation or LLC to optimally internalize the social costs of their
business activities?
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 96
(2005).
196 The effectiveness of intra-church discipline as a constraint has been
questioned. See, e.g., Sargent, supra note 4, at 431 ("[Blishops are constrained by
canon law and are accountable at some level to the Holy See, especially on doctrinal
matters, but a strong tradition of episcopal independence leaves bishops without any
significant supervision in their actual administration of the diocese.").
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himself in accordance with the requirements of canon law is
unlikely to exercise the requisite degree of day to day control over
a separately incorporated parish. As to the latter prong, the
courts have discretion to consider the potentially severe
deleterious impact of liability on the ability of innocent parties to
exercise religious practices implicating constitutionally-protected
values. In other words, while the Free Exercise and
Establishment clauses do not bar judicial application of the alter
ego doctrine to churches, the values protected by those provisions
appropriately may be weighed in the balance. Given the ready
availability of alternative doctrines better suited to the problems
at hand, particularly fraudulent transfer law, the case against
invoking alter ego in this context thus becomes quite strong.
